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The paper analyzes how (production and ﬁnancial) inter-ﬁrm net-
works can aﬀect ﬁrms’ default probabilities and observed default rates:
an issue the recent crisis has brought to the front of the debate. A sim-
ple theoretical model of shock transfer is built up to investigate some
stylized facts on how ﬁrm-idiosyncratic shocks tend to be allocated in
the network, and how this allocation changes ﬁrms’ default probability.
The model shows that the network works as a perfect “risk-pooling”
mechanism, when it is both strongly connected and symmetric. But
the resort to “risk-sharing” does not necessarily reduce default rates
in the network, unless the shock they face is lower on average than
their ﬁnancial capacity. Conceived as cases of symmetric inter-ﬁrm
networks, industrial districts might have a comparative disadvantage
in front of “heavy” ﬁnancial crises such as the current one.
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The world is now experiencing the economic tail of the sub-prime ﬁnan-
cial crisis burst in 2007. The idiosyncrasy of this crisis (e.g. Shiller, 2008;
Reinhart and Rogoﬀ, 2008, 2009) and the diﬀerent resilience exhibited by
countries (e.g. Horta et al., 2008; Frenkel and Rapetti, 2009) have already
been investigated. On the contrary, at the best of our knowledge, the re-
silience of the diﬀerent models of production organization to the crisis has
received no attention.
Nonetheless, this is a further test for the alleged superiority of the “ﬂex-
ible specialization” model of production (e.g. Storper and Christopherson,
1987; Hirst and Zeitlin, 1989; Storper, 1995; Herrigel, 1996; Le Heron, 2009),
and of industrial districts in particular (e.g. Harrison, 1992; Guerrieri et al.,
2003).
In trying to ﬁll this gap, the paper analyzes how inter-ﬁrm (production
and ﬁnancial) networks can actually aﬀect the ﬁrms’ resilience to ﬁnancial
shocks. In particular, it focuses on the risk of default entailed by ﬁrm-
speciﬁc credit constraints and investigates: (i) how the allocation of risk is
aﬀected by the structure of such networks; (ii) how this allocation changes
ﬁrms’ default probabilities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
review and combine the theoretical literature on network models of risk-
sharing, contagion and ﬁnancial stability, with the empirical literature on
the diﬀerent typologies of inter-ﬁrm networks. In Section 3, we build up
a simple theoretical model to analyze the transfer mechanisms of ﬁrms’
idiosyncratic ﬁnancial shocks in inter-ﬁrm networks. Section 4 presents the
main theoretical results of the model. Section 5 discusses their empirical
implications and concludes.
2 Background literature and stylized facts
The scope and speed of diﬀusion of the recent ﬁnancial crises have stim-
ulated the analysis of the conditions under which ﬁnancial contagion can
actually arise. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) refer to phenomena of “bank
run” and self-fulﬁlling panic in the banking system. Drawing on them,
Allen and Gale (2000) analyze how interbank lending brings about domino-
like eﬀects, which could increase the risk of collapse of the whole ﬁnan-
cial system, that is “systemic risk”. Iori et al. (2006), Nier et al. (2007),
Gallegati et al. (2008) and Battiston et al. (2009) have recently re-examined
this issue and found a possible trade-oﬀ between the mutual insurance of
ﬁnancial institutions and systemic risk.
Out of the ﬁnancial literature, the conditions for domino eﬀects (here
called “cascading failures”) to occur and produce “global cascades” have
1been studied by Watts (2002), Motter and Lai (2002) and Whitney (2009).
Along the same research stream, diﬀusion and contagion in networks have
been investigated by, among the others, Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani (2001,
2002), Dodds and Watts (2005) and L´ opez-Pintado (2008). Finally, recent
economic studies have analyzed the eﬃcient and stable conﬁgurations of
“risk-sharing networks”, whose links guarantee the nodes bilateral mutual
insurance (Bramoull´ e and Kranton, 2007b,a; Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007;
Bloch et al., 2008).
However, this literature has not yet been applied to investigate how inter-
ﬁrm networks aﬀect the resilience of ﬁrms in clusters to external shocks.
This is unfortunate, as a number of empirical and theoretical studies have
addressed inter-ﬁrm relations in clusters and their actual structures. Tax-
onomies of them (constellations, hub-and-spokes, satellite platforms and
diﬀerent kinds of industrial districts) have been put forward by Markusen
(1996), Paniccia (1998) and Carbonara (2002). Their evolutionary patterns
have been studied in an industry life-cycle perspective by Carbonara et al.
(2002) and Albino et al. (2006, 2007) – for supply chains in industrial dis-
tricts – and, more recently, by Ter Wal and Boschma (2009) – in terms
of co-evolutionary processes of industries, ﬁrms and networks in clusters.
Finally, the structure of ownership and non-ownership ties in industrial dis-
tricts, their evolution over time and the idiosyncrasies of business groups in
industrial districts have been investigated by Brioschi et al. (2002, 2004).
These inter-ﬁrm networks are mainly made up of production linkages
between diﬀerent typologies of ﬁrms (e.g. ﬁnal producers vs. subcontrac-
tors) and heterogeneous capabilities.1 These production linkages become
extremely important in the aftermath of crises that expose ﬁrms to demand
declines and credit restrictions from formal banking institutions.2
Indeed, inter-ﬁrm production relationships usually entail inter-ﬁrm credit
relationships. On the one side, ﬁrms can obtain credit from subcontractors
through payments delays: a trade credit which requires diﬀerent contractual
power between the parties (Peterson and Rajan, 1997). On the other side,
the supplier may obtain credit from the buyer on the basis of an underly-
1Firms look for networking also in other spheres, such as innovation. For an anal-
ysis of the networks of R&D collaborations see, for instance, Orsenigo et al. (2001),
Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) and Goyal and Joshi (2003).
2Alessandrini et al. (2008, 2009) and Alessandrini and Zazzaro (2008) suggest that lo-
cal banking systems, aﬀecting information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers
at the local level, can reduce ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing constraints. As a matter of fact, physical
proximity, involving long-lasting relationships and in-depth cultural aﬃnity, allows local
banks to collect a greater amount of “soft” information on local borrowers, thus increasing
the quality of screening and monitoring. Nonetheless, since bank decisional centers have
been concentrated over the last decade in a few places, the “functional” distance between
banks and local production systems is increased, thus balancing the positive eﬀects of local
closeness. Their ﬁndings show that these negative eﬀects prevail on those positive eﬀects
associated to “operational” distance, making ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing constraints more binding.
2ing commercial transaction, possibly by discounting the refunding from the
relative payment.
As Dei Ottati (1994) argued in investigating the industrial district of
Prato (Florence, Italy), in local production systems of this kind the in-
terlinking of credit and subcontracting is the common mean to overcome
the problems entailed by supplier-user bilateral monopolies, and to make
credible mutual commitments in long-term relationships (Williamson, 1983,
1985). Indeed, in order to be implemented, this interlinking requires a min-
imum level of cooperation and mutual trust between ﬁrms. On the other
hand, it helps reducing the emergence of opportunistic behaviors and thus
tends to increase the level of social capital in turn. Hence, as much em-
pirical literature shows – in particular, but not only, with respect to the
Italian economy – the interlinking of credit and subcontracting is a relevant
phenomenon when spatial proximity, face-to-face contacts, long-lasting rela-
tionships and in-depth social and cultural closeness play an important role
(Cainelli, 2008).3
3 Model
Let us consider a network of n ﬁrms. Assume these ﬁrms can be linked
through production relationships only, in which one ﬁrm acts as supplier (S)
of intermediate commodities for another ﬁnal producer (F).4 On the basis
of the previous arguments (see Section 2), these production relationships
could entail two possible credit relationships between S and F: (i) trade
credit, that is the credit granted by S to F via payments delays, whose
extent depends on the relative contractual power of the parties; (ii) the
credit to the subcontractor, which is granted by F to S in a interlinking of
subcontracting and credit, as a mean to reduce opportunistic behaviors and
sustain long-term relationships (Figure 1(a)).
In front of ﬁrm-speciﬁc (i.e. individual) shocks, such as, for instance,
credit restrictions from banks or demand downturns, these credit channels
can be conceived as possible transfer mechanisms of the shock, or part of
it, between S and F. In particular, trade credit can allow F to transfer
the shock to S. The credit granted to the subcontractor, as well as the
pre-existence of a credit relationship, can instead enable S to transfer the
shock to F (Figure 1(b)).
3As is well-known, the Italian manufacturing system is an emblematic example of the
coexistence of all these features. On the one hand, most of the Italian manufacturing
activities are concentrated within local systems of small and medium ﬁrms and industrial
districts. On the other hand, in these local production systems subcontracting and trade
credit relationships are very pervasive too Omiccioli (2000); Cocozza (2000).
4Although at the price of a certain lack of realism, the model is kept in its simplest
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Figure 2: Shock transfer
The working of these transfer mechanisms crucially depends on the net-
work structure. In order to study this eﬀect, assume that each ﬁrm i of
the n in the network is hit by an external shock xi0. We then represent
the transfer mechanisms of these idiosyncratic shocks by a weigthed directed
network Γ, where the valued directed edge from ﬁrm/node i to ﬁrm/node j
(δij) measures the share of i’s total idiosyncratic shock that i can transfer
to j (
 n
j=1 δij = 1) (Figure 2).
With this assumptions, the shock experienced by ﬁrm i after one round




























where T is the adjacency matrix of the network Γ, and x′
t the row vector of














where ˆ x′ is the row vector of the allocation of the idiosyncratic shocks in
equilibrium.
We model the initial exogenous shock x0 as a random vector whose
generic element xi0 is made up of of a common trend ( ) and an idiosyncratic
random component (ǫi):5
xi0 =   + ǫi (4)
Moreover, each node/ﬁrm i is characterized by a given threshold θi, which
represents its resistance to external shocks.
Assuming that ˆ x exists and it is in fact unique, the default condition for
ﬁrm i can be:6
ˆ xi(x0;T) > θi (5)
4 Results
Of the simple model above, we ﬁrst search for the limit distribution of the
idiosyncratic shocks in the network and, then, provided that it exists and is
indeed unique, investigate its impact on ﬁrms’ default probabilities. In so
doing, we will analyze the change in the ﬁrms’ default rate induced by the
network of shock transmissions formalized by T.
The model results are ﬁrst presented here in formal terms, while their
economic implications are discussed in the following section.
4.1 Shock transfer and risk distribution
As far as the analysis of the limit distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks in
the network is concerned, it is important to note that, in spite of the fact
that, for what concerns the shock transfer, our model is not probabilistic, T
is formally a right stochastic matrix. Hence, in order to study the allocation
of shocks in equilibrium, we can use a number of useful results from the
theory of ﬁnite Markov chains.7
First of all, following the standard deﬁnitions, we deﬁne the network Γ
(and the related matrix T) as strongly connected if each node can reach
every other by a directed path, i.e. a sequence of distinct nodes i1,i2,...,iK
such that Tik,ik+1 > 0, for each k ∈ {1,2,... ,K}.
5This idiosyncratic component can capture the individual diﬀerences in the experienced
shock or in the buﬀer level of the internal absorption of the shock.
6The higher (lower) the speed of converge of the system to the equilibrium, the more
(less) reasonable such condition is. We will return on the issue later.
7For a textbook treatment of Markov chains see, for instance, Karlin and Taylor
(1975, 1981) and the references therein. Iterated iteraction matrices have been used
also in studies on convergence of beliefs in networks (DeGroot, 1974; DeMarzo et al.,
2003; Golub and Jackson, 2009), prestige and status (Bonacich, 1987; Rogers, 2006), and
strategic games in networks with neighbours’ inﬂuence (Ballester et al., 2006).
5Let us say that the network Γ (and the related matrix T) is aperiodic if
the greatest common divisor of the lengths of its directed cycles is 1, where
a directed cycle is a directed path joining a node to itself, and the length of
the cycle is the number of distinct nodes in the path.8
We can therefore state our ﬁrst proposition.
Proposition 1 If the inter-ﬁrm network Γ is strongly connected and ape-
riodic, the system always reaches an equilibrium in which each ﬁrm bears a
deﬁnite proportion (si) of the sum of all the idiosyncratic shocks (
 
i xi0):
ˆ x′ = s′(
 
i xi0)
where s′ is the left eigenvector of T corresponding to eigenvalue 1 whose
entries sum to 1: s′(I − T) = 0,
 
i si = 1.
Let us note ﬁrst that the condition of aperiodicity for the network is
rather weak and can be assumed as almost always satisﬁed in the present
framework. Indeed, a suﬃcient condition for the network to be aperiodic is
that there is at least one loop (i.e. δii > 0 for some i), that is at least one
ﬁrm which is not able to transfer all the experienced shock in each round.
A formal proof of the proposition is provided in the Appendix. Here we
present a simple illustrative example in case of a network made up of three














In this case, we have:























So, although ﬁrms 2 and 3 are able to transfer all the one-round shock to the
others, the system soon converges to the equilibrium and such equilibrium




Thus, when ﬁrms are hit by the same initial shock, the system of relations
is detrimental (beneﬁcial) for ﬁrm 1 (3).9
In general, thus, the proportion of the sum of all the shocks that, in equi-
librium, accrues to each ﬁrm is not the same. However, given a symmetric
network, i.e. a network whose adiacency matrix is symmetric (δij = δji for
each i,j), the following proposition holds:
8Strictly speaking, a cycle is not a path because the starting (and ending) node appears
twice. However, apart from this minor inconsistency, the deﬁnition is correct and is made
here for convenience.
9So, for instance, if x
′



















Figure 3: Asymmetric strongly connected networks
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Figure 4: A symmetric strongly connected network
Proposition 2 If the network is strongly connected, aperiodic and symmet-
ric, the risk distribution is equalitarian, i.e. each ﬁrm gets in equilibrium a





= ¯ x, ∀i ∈ N
A formal proof of the statement is given in the Appendix. Let us note
here that, apart from the strong connectivity and aperiodicity, the condition
for this “equalitarian” distribution to occur is not that all the linkages are
equal, but only that they are perfectly reciprocated, as the example of Figure
4 illustrates. In this simple three-ﬁrm network, the equilibrium values are:
s1 = s2 = s3 = 1
3, in spite of the fact that the structure of relations of the
three ﬁrms is strongly diﬀerent.10
As we better argue in Section 5, the symmetry condition could be re-
tained to hold in case of industrial districts and, more in general, of lo-
cal production systems characterized by a high level of social capital, sys-
10Indeed, at a ﬁrst glance, ﬁrm 1 might look in a better position than 3, because it is
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Figure 5: Shock releasers/absorbers in non strongly connected networks
tems in which the interlinking of credit and subcontracting is used to rebal-
ance the contractual power of the parties in the supplier-user relationships
(Dei Ottati, 1994).
In general, however, when the symmetry condition does not hold, the
risk distribution is not equalitarian and a diﬀerent portion of the total shock
accrues to ﬁrms (si  = sj). What is important is that such portion depends
on the overall structure of relations.
An example is provided in Figure 3(b), where, despite the simmetry in
the reciprocal relationship, 1 and 2 get diﬀerent parts of the total shock
because of the diﬀerences in their relation with 3: (s1,s2,s3) = (.3,.6,.1).
Finally, when the network is not strongly connected, one or more nodes/
ﬁrms may have zero outdegree or indegree, i.e. no outgoing or ingoing link-
ages.
Nodes with zero indegree and a positive outdegree are shock releasers:
ﬁrms which in the limit are always able to transfer their shock to the others
completely. This is the case showed in Figure 5(a), where ﬁrm 1 (e.g. a ﬁnal
ﬁrm) transfers all its shock to the others (its suppliers via trade credit).
Nodes with zero outdegree and a positive indegree can be called shock
absorbers: they are ﬁrms that sustain the shock of the others without being
able to transfer theirs. This is the case of ﬁrms 2, 3 and 4 in the previous
example,11 as well as of ﬁrm 3 in Figure 5(b).
11In the example, each supplier (ﬁrms 2-4) faces its idiosyncratic shock plus a fraction






Figure 6: A supplier-buyer relation
4.2 Risk distribution and default probabilities
By aﬀecting the actual allocation of idiosyncratic shocks, inter-ﬁrm networks
can change ﬁrms’ default probabilities and, via this, observed default rates.
In this section, we investigate only the two most paradigmatic cases,
that is: i) the default probability of a supplier in a subcontracting relation
without interlinking credit (Figure 6); ii) the default rate of ﬁrms in a sym-
metric and strongly connected network (such as that illustrated by Figure
4). In addition, we provide some insights about the more complex situations
of strongly and asymmetric networks.
The section ends up with a discussion on the speed of convergence, which
is of utmost importance. In fact, given our analysis of default probabilities
at the equilibrium, the lower the speed at which the system reaches the
equilibrium, the more unrealistic is our operational suggestion to analyze
default probabilities at the equilibrium allocation.
4.2.1 Default probabilities of suppliers in supplier-buyer rela-
tions
As for the default probabilities of suppliers in a supplier-buyer relation, given
the idiosyncratic shock:
xi =   + ǫi
assuming that ǫi ∼ (0,σ2), the shock faced by the supplier is:
ˆ xS = xS0 + δFSxF0 ∼
 
(1 + δFS)  , (1 + δ2
FS) σ2 
Thus, the shock experienced by the supplier (ˆ xS) is higher on average and
it is also more volatile than its initial shock (xS0). Clearly, this increases
its default probability with respect to the one of an isolated ﬁrm facing the
shock xi (Figure 7).
4.2.2 Default rates in strongly connected networks
In case of ﬁrms in a symmetric and strongly connected network, from Propo-
sition 2 it follows that ˆ xi = ˆ xj = ¯ x0, for each i,j. Still assuming that
ǫi ∼ (0,σ2), this implies:







9θi   ˆ  
xi ˆ xi
Figure 7: Default probabilities of supplier
Thus, given that each ﬁrm faces in equilibrium an average of all the shocks,
its volatility is reduced. This leads us to state two further propositions.
Proposition 3 Assume that the idiosyncratic components of the shocks are
independently distributed and the number of ﬁrms in the network suﬃciently
large. Then, the default probability of a ﬁrm in a symmetric and connected
network is higher (lower) than that of the same ﬁrm in isolation when the
expected value of the random shock is higher (lower) than its threshold.
A formal proof of this proposition is in the Appendix. Figure 8 shows
the case of a normally distributed shock for a ﬁrm i with threshold θi. The
shadow area under the curves measure the probability that the shock is lower
than the ﬁrms’ threshold, that is the probability of survival for the ﬁrm. As
it clear emerges from the Figure, this area for xi is higher (lower) than the
corresponding area for ˆ xi when the average of the shock ( ) is lower (higher)
than the ﬁrm’s threshold (θi).
Moving from the individual ﬁrm to the network of ﬁrms, if the threshold
is heterogeneous across ﬁrms, but drawn from a common distribution, the
following proposition holds:
Proposition 4 Assume the idiosyncratic components of the shocks are in-
dependently distributed, and so are the threshold values (θi), and in addition
the number of ﬁrms suﬃciently large. Then, the average default rate in a
symmetric and connected network is higher (lower) than the one for isolated
ﬁrms if Pr(θi <  ) > Pr(θi − xi0 < 0) ( Pr(θi <  ) < Pr(θi − xi0 < 0)).
For the simpler case of an homogeneous threshold, the previous propo-
sition reduces to the following proposition:
Proposition 5 Assume the idiosyncratic components of the shocks are in-
dependently distributed, the threshold value is homogeneous across ﬁrms, and
the number of ﬁrms suﬃciently large. Then, the average default rate in a
symmetric and connected network is higher (lower) than the one for isolated










Figure 8: Default probabilities of ﬁrms in symmetric networks
Finally, in case of strongly connected asymmetric networks, the alloca-
tion of the total shock is not equal across ﬁrms. But depends on the overall
structure of bilateral relations and no easy generalisation can be made. In
general, if si is the fraction of the total shock accruing to ﬁrm i, i will face
in equilibrium a shock which is asymptotically normally distributed (by the
central limit theorem) with expected value:


















Hence, if si < 1/n, the ﬁrm in the network have to face a shock which is less
volatile and lower on average than the one it faced in isolation. If instead
1/n < si < 1/
√
n, the ﬁrm’s shock in the network is higher on average but
still less volatile. Finally, when 1/
√
n < si ≤ 1 the ﬁrms’ shock is both
higher on average and more volatile.
On the basis of the previous argument, the following proposition can be
stated (and proved in the Appendix):
Proposition 6 Assume the idiosyncratic components of the shocks are in-
dependently distributed and the number of ﬁrms in the network suﬃciently
large. Then, the default probability of a ﬁrm in a strongly connected asym-
metric network is higher (lower) than that of the same ﬁrm in isolation if
the expected value of the random shock is higher (lower) than θi
sin.
Therefore, in this case, in order to assess the gains of the network, in
terms of a lower default probability, we need to take into account the share
of the overall shock the ﬁrm gets in equilibrium. In particular, if this share
actually makes the expected value of the shock exceed the ﬁrms’ threshold.
11Finally, looking at the default rate for the overall network, what mat-
ters is the correlation between the equilibrium shares, as determined by the
network, and the ﬁrms’ thresholds. So, for instance, if the ﬁrms that in
equilibrium get the higher shares of the overall shocks are those with the
lowest thresholds, the default rate exhibited by these networks can be rela-
tively high in case of low shocks. But comparatively lower in case of strong
common shocks. Indeed, the system of relations makes the weakest ﬁrms,
which would have died anyway, take a larger share of the total shock.
4.2.3 Default analysis and speed of convergence
Our default analysis strongly relies on the operational device to work out
default probabilities at the limiting distribution of shocks. In fact, the slower
the rate at which the system converges to the equilibrium, the less realistic
is our assumption.
Hence, understanding the relationship between the structure of the ﬁrms’
network and the speed of convergence is crucial. In formal terms, the ques-
tion amounts to calculate how long it does take the Markov matrix T to
approach its limit.
This is a well known issue, on which there is in fact a large literature. As
reported by Golub and Jackson (2009), the convergence time is proportional
to 1/log(|λ2(T)|), where λ2(T) denotes the second largest eigenvalue of
T. Therefore, a second eigenvalue close to 1 implies a very low speed of
convergence.
As for the relationship between this mathematical condition and its in-
sights for our model, a useful perspective is the one provided by the ap-
proach based on measuring bottlenecks (Diaconis and Stroock, 1991). The
basic idea is that if there are pieces of the network connected only by narrow
linkages, then convergence is slow.
5 Discussion and ﬁnal remarks
The results of the model suggest a number of interesting interpretations,
once related to the background literature and stylized facts we reviewed.
First of all, the network capacity of working as a “system” in ﬁnancial
terms – in which individual ﬁrms exchange their idiosyncratic shock for a
certain portion of the total shock of the network – crucially depends on the
structure of the network itself. In particular, the strong connectivity of the
network is crucial. Should some or even only one of the ﬁrms be “isolated”
from the twofold transfer mechanism we have described, the network would
lose its system properties.
This can be considered the case of clusters, in which ﬁrms are linked
through subcontracting relationships but with little socio-economic embed-
dedness. Unless the subcontractors in turn further subcontract part of their
12work – which is not uncommon12 – in these chains of “atomistic” producer-
user relationships, the client ﬁrms exploit their larger market power to trans-
fer, via trade credit, their risk to the subcontractors themselves, which thus
get subject to ﬁnancial default exclusively and/or earlier than the former.13
While strongly connected networks are able to work as ﬁnancial systems,
on the other hand, their capacity to translate the idiosyncratic risk of each
ﬁrm into an average of the risk of all the ﬁrms in the cluster is not guaranteed.
In order to have such “equalitarian” risk-pooling, the inter-ﬁrm bilateral
relationships need to be perfectly reciprocated. With beneﬁt of handy sight,
we could say that the district atmosphere the network is embedded in must
be such to exactly compensate, or tend to compensate, the asymmetries
in contractual powers which emerge from user-supplier diﬀerences in size.
Quite interestingly, this result is consistent with the trade-oﬀ local studies
ﬁnd between contractual opportunistic behaviors, on the one side, and social
capital, on the other.14
Interesting implications can be drawn also in terms of default probability,
that is of the actual capacity of the network ﬁrms to bear a ﬁnancial risk
such as the current one. In the case of non strongly connected networks,
when “isolated ﬁrms” are present, those ﬁrms which act as pure absorbers
have been shown to be two times in troubles: not only because do they end
up receiving a shock larger than the average, but also because such a shock
encapsulates the variability of that faced by the other ﬁrms.
Deﬁnitively more interesting is the result for the district network, where
trade credit and interlinking of credit and subcontracting coexist. District
ﬁrms have been shown to be more shock-resilient than isolated ones only
under two important conditions: in the case of symmetric relationships and,
providing the average shock is lower than the threshold of the ﬁrm itself.
Conversely, belonging to the district could even increase the default rate of
the ﬁrm.
This is possibly the most important result of the model. Indeed, it seems
to show that the industrial district model, while enabling ﬁrms to share
the risk of a moderate shock, and to be actually more resilient in “normal”
conditions, does not help and is actually disadvantageous in front of “heavy”
ﬁnancial crisis (such as possibly the current one).15 Quite interestingly, this
12And actually one of the possible extensions of the model.
13The previous result can be used to interpret what is happening, for example, in the
supply-chain network of Fiat automobile in Italy (?). Here, the small subcontractors of
components are actually providing the producer with a remarkable margin of ﬂexibility
both in production and ﬁnancial terms. The FIAT contractual power and the absence of
a district-like environment for the supply-chain are crucial for this to occur.
14In the Italian region of Emilia-Romagna, for example, this has been shown to be the
case of the footwear district of San Mauro Pascoli (Brioschi et al., 2004).
15Under a diﬀerent perspective, the same result points to the production specialization
of the districts, making more (less) fragile those which are specialised in sectors more (less)
exposed to international competition: the diﬀerent destiny of the ceramic tales district of
13result is invariant with respect to the actual structure of the relationships
in the district: “canonically” or not (Paniccia, 1998) does not make any
diﬀerence for its ﬁnancial behavior.
If in strongly connected networks, the twofold credit relationships we
have envisaged are asymmetric, the implications of the model becomes more
blurred, as they depend on the ratio between the share of the overall shock
ﬁrms get (in equilibrium) and the network ﬁrms’ threshold. Still, the in-
sight is that in this case, the network ﬁrms actually split into two groups:
the “winners”, so to say, which are able to transfer to the others part of both
the average and the variance of their shock; the “losers”, whose default rate
increases both because of a higher and a more variable shock. This is an-
other interesting result, which recovers the relevance of the structure of local
production systems in evaluating their resilience to the crisis: indeed, such
a structure turns out to be more important than the bilateral relationships
on which local studies usually focus.
A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 When T is strongly connected, it is a standard
result of the theory of Markov chains that aperiodicity is a necessary and
suﬃcient condition for T to be convergent (e.g. Kemeny and Snell, 1960).
Moreover, when this happens T is also primitive, i.e. Tt has only strictly
positive entries for some t ≥ 1 (e.g. Perkins, 1961), and there is a unique
(up to scale) left eigenvector s of T, corresponding to the unit eigenvalue,




Since T is convergent, S ≡ limt→∞ Tt exists and hence:
ST = lim
t→∞
Tt T = lim
t→∞
Tt = S
where each row of S is equal to s′.
It follows that:


















Proof of Proposition 2 A symmetric network implies T = T′ and there-
fore:





Sassuolo and of the mechanical one of Bologna in Italy, for example, can also be read in
this terms.
14i.e. S must be symmetric too (sij = sji). As in S by deﬁnition sji = sii, the
symmetry implies sii = sij.
Moreover, since the sum by column of each row is one, it follows that:
n  
j=1
sij = n sii = 1
for each i and all the elements of S are equal to 1/n. Hence:

















for each i ∈ N.
Proof of Proposition 3 Given that, in a connected-symmetric network
ˆ xi = ¯ x0 and this variable is asimptotically normally distributed with variance




Pr(ˆ xi > θi) =
 
1 if θi >  
0 if θi <  
On the contrary, since σ2 > 0, there is always a ǫ > 0 such that ǫ < Pr(xi0 >
θi) < 1 − ǫ and this probability is so strictly bound between 0 and 1.
Proof of Propositions 4 Assuming that θi are identically and indipen-
dently distributed, and so are xi0, the number of ﬁrms’ defaults follows a
binomial distribution with expected value: nPr(θi−xi0 < 0). The expected
value of the default rate is therefore simply: Pr(θi − xi0 < 0).
For ﬁrms in a symmetric-connected network, the expected value of the
binomial is instead: nPr(θi − ¯ x < 0), with an expected default rate equals
to: Pr(θi − ¯ x < 0).
Given that ¯ x
p
→   we have that:
lim
n→∞
Pr(θi − ¯ x < 0) = Pr(θi <  )
Hence, the expected default rate of ﬁrms when the number of ﬁrms gets
large is higher (lower) in isolation than in a symmetric-connected network
if Pr(θi − xi0 < 0) > Pr(θi <  ) (Pr(θi − xi0 < 0) < Pr(θi <  )).
Proof of Propositions 5 For a common threshold (θi = θ), we have :
lim
n→∞Pr(¯ x < θ) =
 
1 if θ >  
0 if θ <  
while Pr(xi0 < θ) remains stricly bound between 0 and 1.
15Proof of Propositions 6 The probability of default in a strongly con-
nected asymmetric network for ﬁrm i is:
Pr(ˆ xi > θi) = Pr(si
 
i








¯ x converges in probability toward  , therefore we have that Pr(ˆ xi > θi)
tends to 1 if ¯ x > θi
sin and 0 if instead ¯ x < θi
sin.
On the contrary, since σ2 > 0, there is always a ǫ > 0 such that ǫ <
Pr(xi0 > θi) < 1 − ǫ and the probability in this case is strictly bound
between 0 and 1.
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